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Circuit Confusion: The Growing Divide on Whether Gant Applies to NonVehicular Searches Incident to Arrest
Patrick D. Messmer*
I. INTRODUCTION
The search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
has had a tumultuous history to say the least.1 In 2009, the Supreme Court waded once more into
the fray with its decision in Arizona v. Gant2, which marked yet another change in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.3 While not quite overruling the landmark case, New York v. Belton4,
Gant was a new return to old principles, namely ones that Belton had replaced.5
Specifically, the Gant Court sought to return the search incident to arrest exception, as it
applied to vehicular searches, to the concerns of officer safety and preservation of evidence.6
The Court was concerned that the Belton holding was being interpreted in ways that were no
longer primarily concerned with those two overarching principals of this particular exception to
the warrant requirement. As with any change in standard, the Court considered the implications
of the change, and one of the implications that is still being considered is whether or not the test
for the reasonableness of a vehicular search incident to arrest delineated by the Gant majority
should also be applied outside of the vehicle context.7
This Comment seeks to examine and answer that question. As it stands, the circuits are
split as to whether or not Gant should be extended outside of the motor vehicle context.8 Due to
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the developing circuit split, and the prolificacy of Fourth Amendment litigation, the U.S.
Supreme Court can be expected to address this issue sooner rather than later. When the Court
eventually addresses the issue, it should extend the Gant holding to searches incident to arrest
even outside of the motor vehicle context.
Part II will briefly examine the history and evolution of the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. After some general
background, it will pay particular attention to the application of the exception to motor vehicles.
Part III will discuss the implications of the Gant decision and how it affected the existing
standards for searches incident to lawful arrests. Part IV will demonstrate and analyze the
confusion that Gant has caused among the Courts of Appeals by referencing relevant examples
from three Circuits. Part V will make an argument for the correct interpretation of Gant, namely
that a broad reading of when Gant should be applied, and will make reference to several
examples that show the applicability of a broad interpretation. Finally, the argued-for standard
will be applied to the cases discussed in Part IV as a way of clarifying any remaining
uncertainties.

II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENT

A. The Search Incident to Arrest Exception and Its Murky Years
Historically, courts have been charged with safeguarding the guarantees found in the
Fourth Amendment. These protections―“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . .,”9—are only lawfully
absent when certain circumstances exist. As Justice John Paul Stevens put it, “[s]earches
9
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2

conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to only a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions.”10 One such exception is the search incident to lawful arrest.11
This exception is grounded in concerns for officer safety and the preservation of
evidence; courts are willing to overlook the lack of a warrant if the search is to protect officers
from a reasonable threat or to prevent the arrestee from destroying potentially incrimniating
evidence prior to the execution of the warrant. 12 The Supreme Court itself admits that the
development of this exception has historically been far from consistent, and indeed, has had a
rather tumultuous evolution.13
The search incident to arrest exception first appeared in Weeks v. United States, in which
the Court stated in dictum that the right to “search the person of the accused . . . to discover and
seize the fruits of evidences of crime,” has always been understood as a right of the government
in American law, so long as the search is incident to a lawful arrest.14 The Court took a step in
that direction of including areas surrounding where an arrest is made in the exception when it
decided Carroll v. United States, which broadened the phrase used in Weeks to include
“whatever is found upon his person or in his control . . . ”15 The phrase, “in his control,” clearly
expands the available application of the exception beyond merely the arrestee’s person. Just a
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few months after Carroll, the Court decided Agnello v. United States, stating that the ability to
search the place where an arrest is made is “not to be doubted.”16
Up to and including Agnello, the Court seemed relatively consistent in piecemeal
expansions of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. This ended
after Agnello, however, as the Court’s Fourth Amendment rulings became much murkier
between 1932 and 1950.
The first of these cases is United States v. Lefkowitz, which sought to limit the growth and
application of the exception. 17 Lefkowitz involved a man accused of importing, selling and
distributing “intoxicating liquor” during the Prohibition Era.18 He was arrested in his office, a
room that was approximately 10 feet by 20 feet.19 Upon his arrest, the prohibition agents
searched all of the drawers of his desk, which were unlocked, seizing contents therein.20 The
agents did not have a search warrant, only a warrant for Lefkowitz’s arrest.21 The Court held
that the search of the drawers was unreasonable because there was no crime being openly
committed in the presence of the arresting agents at the time of the defendant’s detention.22
Despite what seems to be strong language applauding a liberal interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, the Lefkowitz opinion was undone fifteen years later, in Harris v. United States.23
A warrant was issued and executed for Mr. Harris after he was thought to have stolen two
checks and to have used them to assist in his forgery efforts.24 The apartment where he lived
consisted of four rooms, each of which was thoroughly searched for “any means that might be

16
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used to commit” the crimes Mr. Harris was accused of.25 The Court held that the search was
permissible because Mr. Harris was in exclusive possession of the apartment and, therefore, the
search could reasonably extend beyond the room in which he was arrested.26 In response to the
dissenters’ charge that this was in effect a validation of a general warrant, the majority asserted
that the search, while intensive, was aimed at finding very specific “means and instrumentalities
by which the crimes charged had been committed.”27
Despite the frustration of the dissenting Justices, they were all vindicated little more than
a year later when the Court decided Trupiano v. United States.28 Justices Frankfurter, Murphy,
and Jackson joined with three of their colleagues to attempt to limit the expansion of the search
incident to arrest exception rendered by Harris.29 Mr. Trupiano and his fellow defendants were
accused of operating an illegal still for the production of whiskey.30 A raid on the property they
were renting was conducted at night, leading to the arrest of a few of Mr. Trupiano’s
compatriots.31 Because one of the men was observed committing a felony, a lawful arrest was
made and a search of the entire premises ensued.32 The Court later invalidated this search and
the subsequent seizures made as a result of it.33 The majority reasoned that the search incident to
arrest exception is supposed to be a strictly limited one in application and, therefore, police need
more than merely a valid arrest to justify a subsequent search.34 There must also be some level
of necessity.35

25
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Less than two years later, in 1950, the pendulum again swung back toward the
preferences of the Harris majority when the Court decided United States v. Rabinowitz.36 Mr.
Rabinowitz was accused, and later convicted, of possessing postage stamps with forged
“overprints.”37 After the police obtained a valid warrant for his arrest, Rabinowitz was
apprehended at his place of business, a one room office open to the public, out of which he sold
his stamps.38 Over Mr. Rabinowitz’s objection, and without a search warrant, agents searched
his desk, safe, and filing cabinet, and thereafter seized over 500 stamps with forged overprints.39
Relying on Agnello and Harris, and discounting Go-Bart and Lefkowitz as only proscribing
general exploratory searches, the Court upheld the legitimacy of the search.40

C. Chimel v. California: The Court Attempts to Inject Some Clarity
After a much-needed nineteen year respite from any more major changes regarding the
search incident to arrest exception, the Court decided Chimel.41 In so doing, the Court lamented
the confused development and inconsistent application of the exception, and then sought to
establish a definitive standard that courts can apply in a way that removes its unpredictable
nature.42 Three police offers went to the defendant’s home with a warrant for his arrest.43 Upon
arresting the defendant, the officers asked to “look around” but the defendant objected.44 The
police informed him that regardless of his objection, they would conduct a search of the premises

36
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“on the basis of the lawful arrest.”45 No search warrant had been issued.46 The Court ruled that
it was unreasonable for the police to search the defendant’s entire house incident to his arrest,
because the search extended beyond his person and “the area from which he might have obtained
either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him.”47
Despite holding that the search was invalid, the Court made it very clear that a police
officer may search an arrestee for weapons that could be used to escape or injure the officer, as
well as for evidence on the arrestee’s person that could be concealed or destroyed.48 The Court
felt that these two concerns should receive the utmost consideration.49 As the Court pointed out,
such a rule as would allow a police officer to search an arrestee’s person for weapons or
evidence would only make sense if the officer could also search the area under the arrestee’s
immediate control.50 Such weapons and evidence within the arrestee’s area of immediate control
pose just as much of a threat to an officer’s safety and are equally subject to concealment or
destruction, as weapons and evidence on an arrestee’s person.51 The Court defined the area
within an arrestee’s “immediate control” as the area “from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”52 Unlike some of the majorities before it, this
Court expressly limited the scope of the search incident to arrest exception, saying “[t]here is no
. . . justification . . . for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs—
or for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in
that room itself.”53

45
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One of the Chimel majority’s greatest concerns was the same as that of Justice Jackson
when he dissented in Harris, namely that there would be no logical way to limit the area that
could be searched once the area was allowed to extend beyond the arrestee’s person and area of
immediate control.54 For added measure, the majority also asserts that the standards set forth in
Harris and Rabinowitz would allow police officers to institute searches of an arrestee’s home not
otherwise justified by probable cause so long as the police timed the arrest to coincide with
moments that the arrestee is in his home.55 The Chimel Court agreed with Judge Learned Hand
that in theory, the power to search without probable cause would not exist if the arrestee were not
at home, but “it is small consolation to know that one’s papers are safe only so long as one is not
at home.”56 Thus the Court endeavored to narrow the exception, which thereafter remained
significantly unchanged until twelve years later, when the Court decided New York v. Belton.57

D. The Search Incident to Arrest Exception Applied to Motor Vehicles
The exception as applied to motor vehicles has had a much less confusing and unstable
history than the exception as a whole. In Preston v. United States, the police were contacted
about three suspicious men sitting in an automobile.58 The officers arrested the men and took
them back to the police station.59 One of the officers drove the vehicle that the men were found
in back to the station, after which it was towed to a garage.60 The officers later searched the
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vehicle, after the men had been booked.61 The police found numerous pieces of evidence during
the search, and after being confronted with this evidence, one of the men confessed to plans to
rob a bank.62
Despite searching a vehicle incident to arrest being reasonable in some scenarios, the
Court stressed that it would not be reasonable in every scenario and, indeed, felt that it was not in
the fact pattern before them.63 The Court saw an important distinction in the fact that the men
had not only been arrested, but were at the police station and the car was in police custody.64
Essentially, this means that neither of the traditional justifications for a search incident to
arrest—officer safety and evidence preservation—were present in Preston.65 The Court
therefore concluded that, under these facts, the search was unreasonable for being “too remote in
time or place to have been made as incidental to the arrest . . . ”66
Arguably one of the most significant Supreme Court decisions regarding the Fourth
Amendment, New York v. Belton attempted to draw a rare bright-line rule for the search incident
to arrest exception.67 Belton resulted from an incident on the New York Thruway: a state trooper
pulled over an automobile that was traveling at excessive speeds.68 In the car were four men,
none of whom, as the officer discovered, owned the car or were related to the owner of the car.69
The trooper also smelled marijuana, at which time he directed the occupants of the vehicle to get
out of the vehicle, and then arrested them for illegal possession of marijuana.70 After patting
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them down and separating them, the officer picked up an envelope that contained marijuana off
of the floor of the car.71 The trooper gave each of them their Miranda warnings and searched
each of their persons.72 The trooper then searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle and
found a leather jacket that belonged to Mr. Belton in the back seat.73 After unzipping one of the
jacket’s pockets, the trooper discovered cocaine.74 Mr. Belton objected to the use of the cocaine
as evidence at trial, contending that the search was unlawful.75
The New York Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Belton, holding that “a warrantless
search of the zippered pockets of an inaccessible jacket may not be upheld as a search incident to
a lawful arrest where there is no longer any danger that the arrestee or a confederate might gain
access to the article.”76 In so holding, New York’s highest court believed that it was following
the principles espoused in Chimel, namely, that once arresting officers and potentially
incriminating evidence are unlikely to be harmed or destroyed, then the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement no longer applies.77 Specifically, the Court of Appeals
stated that “[t]he privacy interest of the arrestee in an object remains intact once he is effectively
neutralized or the object is within the exclusive control of the police.”78 The Court of Appeals
felt that with all of the former occupants of the vehicle already under arrest, separated, and away
from the vehicle they had been in, they were effectively neutralized for purposes of the search
incident to arrest exception.79 The Court of Appeals also claimed that the leather jacket, and
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indeed the vehicle as a whole, was under the exclusive control of the police, and thus the search
was unreasonable.80
Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed, reading Chimel to allow a broader exception
than the New York high court recognized.81 The Court felt the need to establish a bright-line
rule to permanently answer “the question of the proper scope of a search of the interior of an
automobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants.”82 The Court acknowledged
that Chimel had established a standard for a search incident to arrest, in that such a search may
not extend beyond the area within the immediate control of the arrestee, but the Court then
voiced concern over the general inability for courts has a whole to adequately define “area within
the immediate control of the arrestee.”83 Specifically, the Belton Court felt that the definition
was particularly troublesome when the facts involved the interior of a car and the arrestee was an
occupant thereof.84 The Court went on to hold that when the occupant of a vehicle is lawfully
arrested, the police officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of the arrest, search the
passenger compartment of the vehicle.85 The Court further held that the permissibility of
searching the passenger compartment includes any containers found therein, regardless of
whether they are closed or otherwise.86 A container was defined as “any object capable of
holding another object.”87
This holding is significant for several reasons. First, the Court signaled its desire to
establish a bright-line rule by creating a rule that is based on the general assumption that all areas
of the passenger compartment are always within the immediate control of an occupant of the
80

Id.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 453.
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vehicle. Second, the Court, despite its apparent willingness to broaden the scope of the incident
to arrest exception, still placed a temporal restraint on it, i.e. “contemporaneous.”88 As the
dissent points out, this might actually lead to more questions than it answers.89
The dissent is a fervent one, taking aim at the majority’s reasoning, goal, and resulting
opinion.90 Justice Brennan chides the Court for ignoring the underlying principles in Chimel.91
In his view, a bright-line rule is inappropriate for this type of case, in which he believes that
courts should “carefully consider the facts and circumstances of each search and seizure,
focusing on the reasons supporting the exception.”92 Justice Brennan thought not only that the
majority got the wrong answer, but that it in fact was asking the wrong question: “the crucial
question under Chimel is not whether the arrestee could ever have reached the area that was
searched, but whether he could have reached it at the time of the arrest and search.”93
Thornton v. United States gave the Court a chance to reexamine its Belton ruling in
2004.94 A police officer was driving an unmarked car when he noticed another car slow down,
so as not to pull up along side of the officer’s vehicle.95 The officer pulled over so that the car
had to pass him. After getting back onto the street, the officer checked the plates of the
suspicious vehicle and discovered that while they were on a Lincoln Town Car, they had been
issued to a Chevy two-door.96 Before the officer could pull over the car, the petitioner pulled

88
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into a parking lot and got out of the vehicle.97 When the officer pulled up and approached him,
the man seemed nervous.98 The officer asked to pat him down, to which the man agreed, and
then the officer felt a large bulge in the man’s front pocket.99 When asked about it, the man
admitted that he had illegal drugs on his person.100 The officer arrested the man and placed him
in the back seat of the patrol car.101 After the man had been handcuffed and put into the police
car, the officer searched the man’s vehicle.102 The petitioner sought to suppress the evidence
obtained, arguing that he in fact was not an occupant of the vehicle at the time he was arrested
and that, therefore, Belton did not control and the search was illegal.103
The Court was faced with a new question—whether Belton controls even when an officer
does not make contact until the suspect has left the vehicle.104 The Court concluded that it
does.105 The Court believed that the petitioner was close enough to his vehicle, “both temporally
and spatially,” so as to place the vehicle in his immediate control, even though he was
technically no longer an occupant of same.106 In its analysis, the Court explained that there is no
logical reason to decide that the area generally within the arrestee’s immediate control is
determined by whether the arrestee got out of the car because an officer told him to or whether
the officer initiated contact while the arrestee was still in the car.107 The Court asserted that the
same concerns for officer safety and evidence preservation still exist when the arrestee is next to
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the vehicle as when he is inside it.108 The Court pointed out that two different rules for what is
essentially the same situation would merely lend itself to confusion and difficult application.109
The Court admitted that not all contraband in the passenger compartment is likely to be readily
accessible to a recent occupant, especially one who has exited the vehicle.110 Nonetheless, said
the Court, the passenger compartment in general is accessible.111
The dissent took issue with the majority equating a “recent occupant” with an
“occupant,” arguing that the Chimel rule should afford recent occupants of vehicles the same
protections as a recent occupant of a house.112 The dissent is similar to Justice Brennan’s dissent
in Belton, in that it accuses the majority of attempting to extend a bright-line rule, but actually
doing nothing more than causing more questions.113 In this case, obvious questions surround the
term “recent occupant.”114 Justice Stevens was also concerned that, without some limiting
principal, Thornton would serve to broaden the automobile exception to the detriment of
citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.115
The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment is well established. Chaotically winding its way through Supreme Court holdings,
the exception eventually began to resemble its current form after the Court tried to clarify things
in Chimel. Motor vehicles have historically been treated differently than an arrestee’s home or
person, and the search incident to arrest exception is no different. In Belton, later affirmed by
Thornton, the Court extends its broad interpretation of Chimel’s area of immediate control
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analysis to automobiles. The Gant Court sought to rectify some of the confusion over the search
incident to arrest exception as it pertains to motor vehicles.

III. ARIZONA V. GANT’S PLACE IN FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
In 2009, the Supreme Court decided Gant and introduced more changes to the Fourth
Amendment analysis.116 The eventual effects of the decision on the warrant exception to the
Fourth Amendment have not yet been made entirely clear.

A. Factual Background
The police were called to a house where, according to a report by an anonymous tipster,
drugs were being sold.117 When police knocked on the door, Rodney Gant answered.118 The
police ascertained his identity, and then left the residence after Mr. Gant told them that the owner
of the home would be back later that day.119 After leaving, the police officers checked their
records and discovered that Mr. Gant had an outstanding arrest warrant for driving with a
suspended license.120 The police returned to the residence later that day and arrested two
individuals, one for providing a false name and one for possession of drug paraphernalia that
they found near the house.121 Each of these individuals was arrested, handcuffed, and detained in
a separate police car by the time Mr. Gant returned to the residence.122 After he pulled into the
driveway, Mr. Gant exited his vehicle, closed the door, and then walked toward one of the

116
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officers, who had just called to him.123 The officer immediately arrested Mr. Gant, who at that
time was approximately ten to twelve feet from his vehicle.124
Two more police officers arrived on the scene, bringing the total to five officers and three
arrestees.125 Upon arrival by the additional officers, Mr. Gant was placed in one of the empty
patrol cars.126 After securing Mr. Gant in the back of a police vehicle, two of the officers
proceeded to search his car, eventually finding a gun and a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a
jacket on the backseat.127 Mr. Gant moved to suppress the gun and bag of cocaine as evidence,
on the grounds that he believed them to be the products of an illegal and unreasonable search and
seizure.128 According to Mr. Gant, Belton did not in fact authorize the search of his vehicle
because he “posed no threat to the officers after he was handcuffed in the patrol car and because
he was arrested for a traffic offense for which no evidence could be found in his vehicle.”129

B. Arizona Supreme Court v. United State Supreme Court: One Holding, Different Reasons
1. The Arizona Supreme Court
The Arizona Supreme Court ruled in favor of Mr. Gant, holding that the warrantless
search of his vehicle was outside the proper scope of the search incident to arrest exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.130 The state’s high court read Belton as not
answering the “threshold question whether the police may conduct a search incident to arrest at
all once the scene is secure.”131 Therefore, in the court’s view, Belton merely detailed the
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acceptable scope of a search of a vehicle incident to an arrest.132 With such a reading of Belton,
the court concluded that the police could not search Mr. Gant’s vehicle because neither of the
two primary Chimel justifications existed once he had been handcuffed and secured in the back
of a patrol car.133 That is, once an arrestee is safely secured and “under the supervision of an
officer, the warrantless search of the arrestee’s car cannot be justified as necessary to protect the
officers at the scene or prevent the destruction of evidence.”134
2. The Supreme Court of the United States
Despite arriving at the same conclusion as the Arizona high court, the Supreme Court
disagreed with its reasoning.135 The Court acknowledged that there was both textual and
evidentiary support for the Arizona court’s interpretation of Belton, but went on to note that most
lower courts have interpreted the ruling to allow a vehicle search incident to arrest of a recent
occupant regardless of whether the recent occupant is no longer a potential threat.136 “Under this
broad reading of Belton, a vehicle search would be authorized incident to every arrest of a recent
occupant notwithstanding that in most cases the vehicle’s passenger compartment will not be
within the arrestee’s reach at the time of the search.”137 Indeed, as Justice Scalia’s concurrence
pointed out in Thornton, some courts have held searches valid under the Belton rule “even when
. . . the handcuffed arrestee has already left the scene.”138
The Court flatly rejected this broad interpretation of Belton, asserting that such a reading
would “thus untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception.”139 Such a
result would be particularly unpalatable for the Court, since the majority in Belton stated that its
132
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ruling “in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the
basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.”140 To this end, the Court held that
police were authorized to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the
arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of
the search.141 However, not wishing to overrule Belton outright, the Court also held that
circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to lawful arrest when it is
“reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”142
The Court did not affirmatively define “reaching distance,” instead attempting to define
what it is not.143 It seems plausible that this may even have been the point, as the Court did not
want to positively define something because such definitions often lead to general bright-line
rules that are applied to all circumstances. Such an overbroad ruling is precisely what the Court
was doing away with by limiting Belton. However, the Court did list three factors which it
deemed relevant to the discussion of whether or not an arrestee was within “reaching distance”:
(1) the number of officers compared to the number of arrestees; (2) whether or not the arrestee is
in handcuffs; (3) whether or not the arrestee is placed into a patrol car.144
In presenting its case, the State of Arizona argued for keeping the Belton rule in place,
calling for fewer restraints on the scope of searches incident to arrest.145 The State’s argument
centers on the premise that Belton correctly “balances law enforcement interests, including the
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interest in a bright-line rule, with an arrestee’s limited privacy interest in his vehicle.”146 The
Court dispatched the State’s arguments quickly.147 First, the majority informs the State that it
undervalues the privacy interest an individual has in his vehicle, which, while less than the one
he possesses in his home, is substantial nonetheless.148 The Court stressed that this interest is
especially important given that the container rule espoused by Belton allows law enforcement to
search every container within a vehicle once the initial search of the vehicle is valid.149 Second,
according to the Court, the bright-line rule in Belton is more ambiguous in practice than the State
would have the Court believe. To wit, courts are not entirely in agreement as to how close in
time to the arrest or how near to an arrestee’s vehicle a given encounter must take place to be
within the Belton rule.150 The Court was particularly critical of the last of Arizona’s arguments,
that without Belton in place, police officer safety and evidence safeguarding would both suffer
tremendously. As the Court demonstrated, even if the Gant opinion did not explicitly indicate
that the principles of officer safety and evidence preservation as outlined by Chimel were to be
considered in all determinations of the reasonableness of searches incident to arrest, there is still
ample precedent besides Belton to protect those interests.151
The majority then turns its attention to two of the counterarguments that the dissenters
present: (1) that the doctrine of stare decisis mandates faithfulness to the then-current
interpretation of the Belton rule, and (2) that consideration of police reliance on prior precedent
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warrants not overturning said precedent.152 The majority rejected the stare decisis argument on
the grounds that there is no obligation to “follow a past decision when its rationale no longer
withstands ‘careful analysis.’”153 Additionally, the Court asserted that it has never allowed stare
decisis to excuse the continuation of an unconstitutional law enforcement policy.154 Finally, the
Court noted that the respective facts of Belton and Gant can be distinguished from one another
with relative ease: in Belton, one police officer was attempting to deal with “four unsecured
arrestees suspected of committing a drug offense,” whereas in Gant, there were several officers
and only one arrestee, who was securely detained in the back of a patrol car.155 In response to
Justice Alito’s argument that the good faith reliance on the Belton standard by police officers
merits some consideration when deciding whether or not to overrule the standard,156 the majority
declared that the reliance of police officers does not trump the “countervailing interest” that all
citizens have in seeing their constitution fully protect their rights.157
Justice Scalia, while not exactly enthused by the majority’s holding, decided that he had
an obligation to vote for the lesser of two evils, in this case the majority (the other being the
dissent’s wish to reaffirm the Belton standard).158 Scalia felt that the Court should have gone
further in its holding and overruled Belton outright.159 He felt that the proper standard was that a
“vehicle search incident to arrest is ipso facto ‘reasonable’ only when the object of the search is
evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made, or of another crime that the officer has
probable cause to believe occurred.”160 Conspicuously, Scalia favored removing considerations
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of officer safety from determinations of reasonableness in regards to searches incident to
arrests.161 His opinion was that officer safety was effectively a straw man argument, in that
police face the greatest risk of harm prior to an arrest being made, and to allow the police to
search a vehicle after they have already successfully arrested the suspect does nothing to curtail
the risk of harm inherent in the act of arresting a suspect.162 To drive his point home, Scalia gave
an open invitation to the government to provide evidence of “a single instance in which a
formerly restrained arrestee escaped to retrieve a weapon from his own vehicle.”163

IV. DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE APPLICABILITY OF GANT TO
NON-VEHICULAR SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST
Since the Court handed down the Gant decision, the courts of appeals have not uniformly
interpreted and applied its holding.164 Some circuits are open to the idea of broadening Gant’s
reach when the right case comes before the court, but others see little to no reason to extend
Gant’s principles beyond the vehicular context.165 There are a number of cases that have
addressed this issue thus far, which have illustrated the different approaches that the circuit
courts have taken.
A. The Third Circuit
1. United States v. Shakir166
Naim Nafis Shakir was suspected of robbing a bank in Pennsylvania.167 A magistrate
judge issued a warrant for his arrest, and eventually investigators found Shakir in Atlantic City,
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where Mr. Shakir was believed to have “gambling ties.”168 When detectives arrived at a hotel
that Mr. Shakir was believed to have stayed at recently, they discovered that Mr. Shakir was
expected to check-in later that day.169
That afternoon, Dectective Smith spotted Mr. Shakir standing in line, waiting to check
in.170 Smith approached Mr. Shakir, arrested him and immediately patted him down for
weapons, finding none.171 Mr. Shakir was compliant and polite and dropped his bag at his feet at
Detective Smith’s request.172 Due to Mr. Shakir’s girth, Smith was unable to handcuff the man
until two more policemen arrived five minutes later with additional handcuffs.173
After Mr. Shakir was safely detained, Detective Smith searched the bag that Mr. Shakir
had been carrying.174 He found clothing and large amounts of cash, but no weapons.175 The
police discovered that the cash was stolen and Mr. Shakir was indicted for armed robbery.176 He
moved to have the cash suppressed because, as he argued, he was already handcuffed when the
search took place and, therefore, had no access to any weapon or evidence that could have been
in the bag.177 In response to Mr. Shakir’s argument, the Government cited several cases that
allowed a search incident to arrest despite the arrestee already being in handcuffs. However, all
of the cases that the Government cited predated the Gant ruling.178
The Government dismissed Gant as not controlling because the facts of the case involved
a vehicular search incident to arrest and because the holding was essentially an elucidation of
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how to properly interpret the Belton ruling, which also dealt with a vehicular search incident to
arrest.179 However, the Third Circuit was not as prepared to disregard Gant entirely.180 As the
court pointed out, “[t]he Gant Court itself expressly stated its desire to keep the rule of Belton
tethered to ‘the justifications underlying the Chimel exception.’”181
The Third Circuit stated that many judicial opinions had looked at Belton as having
relaxed the rule for searches incident to arrest in all contexts.182 By the court’s reasoning, if
courts of appeals were so willing to broadly apply Belton, then a case that issued a limitation on
Belton should also be duly applied.183 The court believed that Gant should apply to any
“situation where the item is removed from the suspect’s control between the time of the arrest
and the time of the search.”184 The court went on to hold that a “search is permissible incident to
a suspect’s arrest when, under all the circumstances, there remains a reasonable possibility that
the arrestee could access a weapon or destructible evidence in the container or area being
searched.”185
The court also noted that despite the restrictions placed on Belton, the standard remained
a lenient one.186 This is true for, as the court saw, three reasons. First, the Supreme Court chose
not to adopt a strict two-prong test that would allow a search incident to arrest only if the arrestee
was both unsecured and within reaching distance of the container or vehicle to be searched.187
Instead, the Court did not mention the arrestee’s secured or unsecured status in the summation of
its holding, relying instead, as the Third Circuit saw it, on the single factor of whether or not a
179
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suspect can reasonably access a location or container.188 Second, the Supreme Court did not
intend to prohibit all searches of containers once an arrestee has been restrained.189 And third, to
prohibit a search incident to arrest whenever an arrestee is handcuffed would expose police to an
unreasonable risk of harm, which would run counter to the Chimel principles that the Supreme
Court was trying to uphold.190
B. The Eighth Circuit
1. United States v. Brewer191
Agent Meggers of the Iowa Division of Narcotics Enforcement arranged to purchase
crack cocaine from Mr. Brewer.192 The two met, and while under surveillance, completed a sale
of 13.2 grams of crack cocaine for $800.193 The team monitoring the sale previously knew that
Mr. Brewers had a suspended license and arranged to have him pulled over as he left the parking
lot.194 He was arrested for driving with a suspended license and the police recovered the $800
was recovered during the arrest.195 For several more weeks Mr. Brewer sold crack cocaine to
Agent Meggers, until he was eventually arrested for unlawful distribution of a controlled
substance.196
At trial, Mr. Brewer moved to suppress the $800 as evidence illegally obtained from an
unlawful search.197 It was his contention that the Gant ruling prohibited the search of his van
because he had already been removed and detained and, therefore, the police could not have
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reasonably believed that he was able to access its interior.198 The court noted that at trial Mr.
Brewer claimed that the money had been found on his person, but now claims that it had been
taken from the van.199 The court looked to other testimony and made a factual determination that
the money had been found on Mr. Brewer’s person.200
Once the court determined that the cash was seized from Mr. Brewer’s person rather than
his van, it seemed to breathe a little easier, and dismissed the application of Gant out of hand.201
The court stated, in pertinent part, that Gant was merely concerned with “when the police may
search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to arrest.”202 The Court eventually
upheld the search, but for the purposes of this Comment, only the Court’s dismissal of the
possibility of expanding Gant to non-vehicular searches incident to arrest is relevant.203
2. United States v. Perdoma204
An investigator for the Nebraska State Patrol, Alan Eberle, was on plain clothes duty in a
Greyhound bus terminal when he noticed a man, Jesus Perdoma, get out of a black SUV with a
small bag.205 Eberle followed the man to the ticket window and observed him while he ordered a
one-way ticket to Des Moines, Iowa.206 After noticing that Perdoma’s hands were shaking and
that he appeared nervous, Eberle decided to approach Perdoma.207 He identified himself as a
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police officer and, after assuring Perdoma that he was not under arrest, asked if he would mind
answering some questions.208
During the course of the questioning, Perdoma lied to Eberle about how he had arrived at
the bus terminal and about not having any identification on him, which Eberle had seen when
Perdoma paid for the bus ticket he purchased.209 Having smelled marijuana coming from
Perdoma, Eberle asked to see his wallet.210 Rather than produce his wallet, which had his
identification in it, Perdoma turned and ran.211 With the help of another Nebraska State Patrol
officer, Investigator Scott, Eberle was able to wrestle Perdoma to the ground.212 Eberle and Scott
then placed Perdoma under arrest, handcuffed him, and led him to an area in the rear of the
terminal.213 Eberle searched Perdoma’s person and discovered four ounces of marijuana in the
pocket of Perdoma’s pants.214 Meanwhile, Scott searched the bag that Perdoma had come in
with and found approximately one pound of methamphetamine.215 Perdoma moved to suppress
the evidence.216
The district court applied part two of Gant’s holding and determined that the search was a
valid one because in light of the marijuana, it was reasonable for the arresting officers to believe
that the defendant’s bag contained evidence of a drug crime.217 The court of appeals saw it
differently, and felt that Gant was inapplicable in the factual circumstances of the case.218 The

208

Id. at 747.
Id. at 747–48.
210
Perdoma, 621 F.3d at 748.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Perdoma, 621 F.3d at 748.
217
Id.
218
Id. at 751 (“Perdoma has not meaningfully argued, on appeal or before the district court, how the circumstances
of his arrest in a public bus terminal rendered him ‘secured’ and out of reaching distance of his bag in a manner
analogous to the circumstances in Gant. Therefore, we need not contemplate here to what extent Gant has
application beyond the context of vehicle searches.”).
209

26

court left open the possibility of using the Gant ruling in some way in a non-vehicular search, but
determined that this was not the case in which to do that.219
Perdoma’s argument centered around the proposition that the bag could not have been
searched incident to his arrest because, by being handcuffed and escorted by two police officers,
he was necessarily “secured” within the meaning of Gant and, therefore, the bag was per se
outside of the area of his immediate control.220 The court of appeals rejected this argument:
“Whether an officer has exclusive control of a seized item does not, however, necessarily
determine whether the item remains in the area from within which the arrestee might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”221 Looking at factors such as where the arrest
occurred, that Perdoma had already run from the police, and that the police might not know how
strong he was, the court felt that the record suggested that the bag was still within “the area into
which the arrestee might reach.”222
In addition to emphatically disagreeing with the majority that Perdoma should have done
more to preserve the issue of whether the search was unreasonable, the dissent takes issue with
the majority’s handling of the Gant ruling.223 The dissent looks at the record of the case very
differently than the majority, noting that Eberle testified at trial that the bag was searched “in the
presence of three officers after Perdoma had been apprehended, placed in handcuffs, and
removed from the public terminal.”224 The dissent’s reading of the Gant opinion is even more
broad than the Third Circuit’s in Shakir, arguing that Gant did in fact set out a two-prong test
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that requires the arrestee to be unsecured and in reaching distance of the passenger compartment
of the vehicle for the search incident to arrest exception to apply.225
The dissent then lists three reasons why the majority’s efforts to discount Gant outside of
vehicular searches are unpersuasive: (1) all Gant sought to do is return the analysis to that of
Chimel, which did not itself deal with a vehicular search; (2) the Gant Court obviously
contemplated its applicability outside the vehicular context because it added part two of the
holding, which it expressly limited to vehicular searches; and (3) Belton has been consistently
cited and applied outside of the vehicular context, even though it dealt with a vehicle search.226

V. THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF GANT
In light of what appears to be an emerging split among the circuits, one that will
inevitably become more pronounced as more and more courts get briefs arguing that Gant also
applies to non-vehicular contexts, the Supreme Court will inevitably have to address this issue.
Indeed, only a year after the Supreme Court decided Gant, there were already at least three
different opinions out of two circuits, each of which answered the question in a manner distinct
from the others. It is therefore only a matter of time before the Court has before it a case that
will ask it to either limit or expand the principles that it set forth in Gant. The Court should
expand the protections found in Gant to searches incident to arrest that take place outside and
independent of the vehicular context. To demonstrate the viability of such expansion of the Gant
protections, this Comment will apply the argued-for broader standard will be applied to some of
the cases discussed above in Part IV—as well as a case, United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 705
(5th Cir. 2011), that fits the factual criteria but in which the court declined the opportunity to
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answer the question of whether or not Gant applied because it had another, much easier way to
resolve the contest before it.
A. Broader is Better
The Supreme Court should interpret and apply Gant broadly, not just in the context of
vehicular searches incident to arrest, but also to non-vehicular searches incident to arrest. As
there is currently no consensus among the circuits that have considered the issue, the Court has a
great amount of flexibility in the rule it crafts. The best interpretation of the Gant rule is that of
the Third Circuit. The majority in Shakir held that a Gant search incident to arrest is permissible
when, under all the circumstances, there remains a reasonable possibility that the arrestee could
access the container or area being searched, regardless of whether or not the area to be searched
happened to be inside a vehicle.227 Factors for this “reasonable possibility” could include: (1) the
number of law enforcement officers at the scene compared to the number of arrestee’s; (2)
whether or not the arrestees were securely detained; and (3) whether or not there is a risk of
evidence of the crime of arrest being destroyed. This test would be easy to apply, allow for clear
and consistent rulings, and would protect citizens' Fourth Amendment rights of citizens.
There are several reasons why the Gant test should not be limited to vehicular searches
incident to arrest. First, as the Third Circuit pointed out in Shakir, as well as the dissent in
Perdoma, the courts of appeals have applied the Belton standard numerous times to cases outside
the vehicular context. Indeed, in 1981, the very year that the Supreme Court decided Belton, the
Eighth Circuit applied it to a non-vehicular search incident to arrest in United States v.
Mefford.228 Three years later, the Eighth Circuit again applied Belton outside of the motor
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vehicle context in United States v. Palumbo.229 The Seventh Circuit and D.C. Circuit have also
applied Belton to non-vehicular searches incident to arrest.230 In United States v. Abdul-Saboor,
the D.C. Circuit extended Belton to cover the search of an apartment,231 and in United States v.
Tejada, the Seventh Circuit applied Belton to the search of a cabinet inside a home.232
The dissent felt that it would be hard pressed to determine a logical rationale for not
applying Gant outside of a vehicular context when it modified the Belton ruling, which merely
applied the non-vehicular search incident to arrest principals found in the Chimel ruling to a
vehicle search. Indeed, Justice Alito lamented the fact that “there is no logical reason why the
same rule should not apply to all arrestees.”233 However, the situation is not as dire as Justice
Alito imagined it. The expansion of Gant to cases other than those involving vehicular searches
would mean fewer standards for police to worry about, which in turn could lead to less confusion
over whether a given search is appropriate.
However, one can imagine an argument against applying Gant outside of the vehicular
context. While at least one Court of Appeals applied Belton outside of the vehicle context, it
seems that the Supreme Court never explicitly did. Therefore, it could be argued that the lower
court was simply misreading the Belton ruling and that it never was meant to apply beyond
automobiles. If this is the case, then the argument that Gant should apply in such circumstances
because it modified Belton would have no weight in determining whether Gant applied beyond
vehicles. This is a valid, but ultimately unsound argument. The Court in Belton felt that it was
merely applying the Chimel search incident to arrest analysis to the particularly difficult factual
229
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circumstances surrounding arrests made when the arrestee was driving a motor vehicle.234
Because the Court felt that it was creating a holding specific to the application of Chimel to the
vehicle context, it felt more comfortable creating a bright-line rule. There is no other selfcontained enclosure like an automobile that would allow for the exact same bright-line rule
delineated in Belton, namely that the police may, so long as an occupant of a vehicle is lawfully
arrested, contemporaneously search the passenger compartment of the vehicle, including any
containers therein.235 This type of bright-line rule could not be applied readily to a non-vehicular
search.
There are important differences between that holding and the Gant holding that make the
latter more flexible in how it is applied. As discussed above, the Court in Gant held that police
can only search the passenger compartment incident to arrest when an arrestee is unsecured and
within reaching distance of same.236 This rule no longer depends on the mere presence of an
arrestee in a passenger compartment, but rather sets out factual and spatial restrictions, i.e.
whether the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance, in order to determine if a
warrantless search is unreasonable. Because of the Court's obvious change of a vehicleexclusive bright-line rule, it should be apparent that regardless of the application of Belton to
non-vehicular circumstances, Gant can be applied more broadly.
The second reason that Gant should extend to situations outside the vehicular context is
historical consistency. Throughout Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, one’s vehicle has never
been afforded as much protection as one’s home or person.237 It would be bizarre for the Court
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to suddenly make it more it more difficult for police officers to search a vehicle than a home by
furnishing extra protections on the former but not the latter. The opinion does not overtly make
any such change, and it would be very peculiar for any court of appeals to infer one.
The third reason that Gant should also apply to non-vehicular searches is that one of the
Court’s self-declared goals for the Gant holding was to bring the analysis back to the principles
elucidated in Chimel.238 This is significant because the search in Chimel involved an arrestee’s
house, not his car.239 If the Court wanted to go back to the principles that it considered central to
a ruling that had nothing to do with vehicular searches, then it must have contemplated Gant’s
applicability to non-vehicular searches.
The fourth reason that the Court should formally extend Gant protections to nonvehicular searches is that the very language of the Gant holding indicates that the Court intended
the test to apply broadly. Part one of the holding—that police may search a vehicle incident to
the arrest of a recent occupant only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search—should be read to apply in nonvehicular search situations because part two of the holding is expressly limited to the
“circumstances unique to the vehicle context.”240 The Court consciously chose to insert the
limiting language only in part two of the holding. If the Court also wished for part one of the
holding to only apply in the narrow circumstance of vehicular searches, then presumably the
limiting language would also have appeared in part one, or otherwise inserted in such a way as to
make it clear that the Gant holding was to be applied only in the vehicular context.
B. The Broader Standard Applied
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As a means of demonstrating the workability and appropriateness of the Gant standard to
non-vehicular searches, this Comment will now apply the test to cases discussed in Part IV of
this Comment, as well as another case that could have addressed the question had the court of
appeals not relied on the good faith exception to uphold the search without ever reaching the
underlying question of whether or not Gant could apply to a cell phone retrieved from a vehicle.
1. U.S. v. Curtis241
While trying to buy a high-end vehicle, Curtis made a false statement on his credit
application, using the Social Security Number of a seven year old girl.242 An internal
investigator for the dealership caught this and reported the fraud to a member of the anti-fraud
task force.243 Agent Edwards, a member of the Secret Service and anti-fraud task force,
investigated the matter and subpoenaed Curtis’s bank records.244 A close examination led
Edwards to believe that Curtis was masterminding a complex mortgage loan fraud scheme
(which he was in fact involved in).245
Edwards obtained an arrest warrant for the charge of making a false statement to obtain
credit, a charge unrelated to the mortgage scheme.246 The warrant was executed while Curtis
was driving.247 Prior to being pulled from the car, Curtis placed the cell phone he had been using
on top of the center console within the passenger compartment of the vehicle.248 Edwards
grabbed the phone while Curtis was being arrested and began looking through his text messages,
which he again did later while Curtis was going through prisoner processing.249 While Curtis
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was going through prisoner processing, Edwards discovered incriminating messages about the
mortgage fraud scheme.250 The court in this case never reached the question of whether Gant
applied because it relied on the good faith exception.251 Since the court declined the opportunity
to address the applicability of Gant, this Comment will do so. For the sake of discussion, his
Comment will assume that the good faith exception does not apply.
The search would most likely be invalidated under the first holding of Gant: there is no
way to reasonably say that the phone was within Curtis’s area of immediate control while he was
going through prisoner processing. Thus, neither of the primary concerns of officer safety or
evidence preservation could justify such a warrantless search, especially given that the test, as
outlined by the Court, calls for the test to be applied at the time of the search, and since the
search took place later while Mr. Curtis was going through prisoner processing. Perhaps it could
be successfully argued that the first preliminary search of the phone’s messages at the scene was
acceptable, but there is no reasonable excuse not to have obtained a warrant for the subsequent
searches of the phone. At that point there was no danger of the evidence being lost, there was no
concern regarding officer safety, and the unique circumstances surrounding automobiles were no
longer present. Under such facts, the search incident to arrest exception would not apply,
especially under a Gant analysis.
Whether or not the search is valid becomes decidedly less clear under the second part of
the Gant holding. It might be possible for Edwards to argue that he reasonably believed that
evidence of the crime of arrest, making a false statement to obtain credit, was on the phone. It is
potentially plausible that Curtis kept an email or text message telling someone of his plan. This
still seems to be a stretch, however, given that there does not seem to be much evidence needed
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aside from the fraudulent paperwork. Additionally, a court would be less likely to stretch an
exception in a case such as this, where no one is really in danger and there are no real
consequences to simply waiting and obtaining a warrant to search the phone.
2. U.S. v. Brewer
As outlined in Part IV.B.1 above, Brewer involved an attempted suppression of $800
seized after an undercover crack cocaine sale.252 Under the appropriate reading of Gant, the
search should be upheld. An initial pat-down and search of an arrestee’s person is nearly always
valid, and that was not changed or diminished by Gant in the least. Indeed, The Court used Gant
to reaffirm the principles underlying Chimel, i.e. officer safety and evidence preservation. Patdowns and searches of an arrestee’s person are considered essential to those goals. There is
nothing in the Gant holding to suggest that it could ever be applied to the arrestee’s person.
3. U.S. v. Perdoma
As stated in Part IV.B.2 above, Perdoma dealt with an attempted suppression of evidence
obtained from a suspect's luggage at a train station.253 If Gant is applied, then the search is
almost certainly invalidated in this case. The majority is mistaken in its contention that the
record supports a finding that the bag was still within the arrestee’s area of immediate control.
The arrestee had been tackled by two officers, and was under the supervision of an additional
officer, while the other two searched his person and his bag. Furthermore, one of the arresting
officers testified to the fact that they had moved the arrestee away from the public, to a different
area of the bus terminal. Once the police securely detained, the risk of harm to police
presumably falls sharply. Since that cannot then be the determining factor, the court must look
to evidence preservation as the only remaining Chimel justification. If the police searched the
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arrestee’s person and had him supervised by an additional police officer, then chances are good
that the arrestee will be hard pressed to destroy any evidence. These facts are perfect for
applying the factors that should be used to determine whether or not a “reasonable possibility”
exists. The arrestee in Perdoma is out-manned by at least three to one, is securely detained and
supervised by another police officer, and has no reasonable way to even attempt to destroy
evidence, let alone to succeed at it. It is highly unlikely that a court applying Gant to this
scenario will determine that a “reasonable possibility” exists.

VI. CONCLUSION
The holding in Gant should apply beyond the motor vehicle context. The Gant Court had
ample opportunity to make it clear that part one of the holding should only be applied in the
vehicular context, but the majority made no such assertion. In addition, since Gant modified
Belton, which itself was applied to non-vehicular searches incident to arrest, it is appropriate that
Gant too be extended in other arenas. One of the self-stated goals of the Gant Court was to
return Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the principles found in Chimel, a case that involved a
non-vehicular search incident to arrest. Finally, it would be very strange for motor vehicles to
receive additional protections that the home does not, since traditionally the home is afforded a
much greater amount of privacy.
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